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Boundary Dispute: The Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality as Judicial Nondelegation 
 
It has been said that congressional silence is an invitation for 
other branches of government to exercise policymaking authority.1 If 
that aphorism holds true with respect to the judiciary, the current 
Supreme Court appears to have categorically declined that invitation, 
at least for cases involving extraterritorial activity.  
In addressing extraterritorial cases, courts are confronted with a 
question that has profound consequences for structural norms and 
plaintiffs bringing claims under U.S. statutes: when should the laws 
of the United States apply to activity occurring primarily in another 
country? The Supreme Court has answered this question with the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, a canon of statutory 
interpretation that presumes, absent a clear congressional indication 
to the contrary, that U.S. laws do not apply abroad. In the past six 
years, the Court has applied the canon in a wide variety of cases—
from foreign securities suits and human rights claims to racketeering 
and money laundering allegations brought by foreign countries. 
Through these cases—which have critical repercussions for 
transnational economic activity—the Court has established the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as a strong categorical rule 
that bars large swaths of suits by foreign plaintiffs. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court’s use of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has attracted significant criticism from the academy. 
Scholars have challenged the presumption as an unnecessarily blunt 
instrument for managing conflict with foreign nations and a poor 
proxy for congressional intent.2 More importantly, the presumption’s 
critics argue that it fails to preserve separation-of-powers interests, or 
that by applying the presumption the Supreme Court engages in 
judicial activism, supplanting its territorial vision for that of 
Congress.3 Criticisms of this variety have increased following RJR 
 
 1. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (discussing the interplay between congressional silence and executive power). 
 2. See infra Section III.A. 
 3. See infra Section III.B. 
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Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, where the Court applied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality separately to the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act’s (RICO) substantive 
provisions and private cause of action.4 In the hands of the current 
Supreme Court, critics allege, the presumption “has paradoxically 
become a thoroughly judge-directed creature”5 used to “override 
Congress in defining the proper scope of litigation in U.S. courts.”6 
This Comment challenges the idea that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has departed from its separation-of-powers 
moorings. Instead, it argues that the Supreme Court’s recent 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence makes sense when understood as 
nondelegation. Specifically, the Court’s assumption that Congress 
does not intend statutes to apply extraterritorially unless it clearly 
states otherwise is, in fact, an assumption that Congress does not 
delegate the enormous, policy-laden power of deciding whether to 
extend the laws of the United States abroad to the judiciary. This 
nondelegation assumption is grounded in a notion long associated 
with the presumption against extraterritoriality—that the 
Constitution assigns responsibility for both policy-making and 
foreign affairs to the political branches, not the courts. 
Viewing the presumption against extraterritoriality as 
nondelegation sheds light on outstanding puzzles surrounding its 
application. Not only does the characterization reconcile the 
rationales the Supreme Court has used to justify the presumption, it 
also refutes critiques that the presumption is merely territoriality-
oriented judicial activism. This nondelegation paradigm makes clear 
that the Court’s use of the presumption is a request for 
congressional guidance, rather than a policy decision by the Court. 
By shifting the question of extraterritoriality back to Congress, the 
Court cedes policy-laden decisions regarding the reach of U.S. 
statutes to the political process and prevents lower courts from 
embarking on expeditions in foreign policy-making without the 
compass of clear congressional approval. Moreover, when 
understood as nondelegation, it becomes apparent that the Court’s 
 
 4. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 5. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Frankenstein’s Monster of Extraterritoriality Law, 110 
AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 51, 51 (2016). 
 6. Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 
134, 134 (2016). 
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insistence on applying the presumption against extraterritoriality 
separately to private causes of action and in cases where there are 
no apparent foreign affairs concerns reflects a coherent 
interpretative approach. 
The nondelegation characterization of the Supreme Court’s 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence also explains the Supreme Court’s 
commitment to the presumption against extraterritoriality to the 
exclusion of other, more flexible approaches. Unlike these 
discretionary inquiries, the presumption ensures that courts do not 
wander into the fraught mists of foreign policy. By directing lower 
courts to shift extraterritoriality inquiries to Congress, the Court 
helps avert the problems that have resulted from previous judicial 
attempts to provide answers to questions of foreign policy. While 
ambiguities persist, they are ambiguities that call upon courts to 
make interpretative determinations, rather than pure foreign policy 
ones. In this sense, the presumption against extraterritoriality shifts 
the interpretive game to the judiciary’s home court. 
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I lays out the history, 
current status of, and common justifications for the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Part II argues that the presumption is an 
application of the nondelegation doctrine to a congressional 
delegation to the judiciary. Part III explains how understanding the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as nondelegation helps solve 
extant puzzles associated with the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, such as why it applies in cases where there is no 
potential for foreign conflict, separately to a statute’s substantive 
provision and private right of action, and to jurisdictional statutes. It 
also discusses the institutional competence and other considerations 
underlying the Supreme Court’s apparent preference for the 
presumption over other interpretive tools. Part IV concludes. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part outlines the legal landscape with respect to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Section A describes the 
presumption in general terms and discusses its history and evolution, 
with an emphasis on the Court’s three most recent extraterritoriality 
cases, Morrison, Kiobel, and RJR Nabisco. Section B sets out the 
rationales commonly associated with the presumption. 
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A. Development of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
The presumption against the extraterritorial application of 
statutes is a canon of statutory construction that assumes Congress 
does not intend statutes to apply outside of the borders of the 
United States unless the statutes clearly specify otherwise. The 
presumption is not a limit on Congress’ legislative power—it does 
not impede congressional directives clearly intended to apply 
extraterritorially—but an assumption that “[w]hen a statute gives no 
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”7 
The first judicial articulation of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was distinctly territorial. According to Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, fundamental principles of territoriality 
demanded “in case of doubt . . . a construction of any statute as 
intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial 
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”8 
Over time, however, this stringent territorial view of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality gave way to variety of context-
specific factor tests.9 Though nominally acknowledged, the 
presumption against extraterritorially was rarely employed.10 
In 1991, however, the Supreme Court breathed new life into the 
presumption in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco).11 The 
Aramco Court considered whether an American citizen fired in Saudi 
Arabia12 could bring a Title VII discrimination suit against Aramco, a 
U.S. corporation, given that the conduct and injury occurred outside 
of the United States.13 The Court held that absent clear 
congressional intent to the contrary, it would construe statutes to 
 
 7. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
 8. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (holding that the 
Sherman Act applies only to conduct occurring within the territorial borders of the 
United  States). 
 9. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 10. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 
16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998). 
 11. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
 12. The plaintiff in the case filed suit against Aramco and Aramco Services Company 
(ASC), both of which were incorporated in Delaware. Id. at 247. While Aramco’s principal 
place of business was Saudi Arabia, ASC’s was in Houston, Texas, which is where the plaintiff-
employee was hired. Id. 
 13. Id. at 248. 
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apply only to activity occurring within the United States.14 Because 
there was no clear evidence that Congress intended Title VII to 
apply overseas, the presumption against extraterritoriality barred the 
plaintiff’s claims.15 
Nearly twenty years after Aramco, the Court clarified the outlines 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd.16 In Morrison, the Court considered whether 
foreign investors could sue for fraud under section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against National Australia Bank 
with respect to securities listed on foreign stock exchanges.17 The 
alleged fraud arose when National Bank officials made public 
statements that HomeSide, its Florida-based subsidiary, was 
performing well but wrote down over two billion dollars of 
HomeSide’s assets just one month later.18 The Court’s analysis 
considered both whether Congress had clearly indicated that section 
10(b) applied extraterritorially and whether the domestic conduct 
(the deceptive statements) rendered the presumption against 
extraterritoriality inapplicable altogether. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Scalia answered the first question by noting that neither the 
statutory text nor context indicated that Congress intended section 
10(b) to apply abroad.19 With respect to the second inquiry—
whether the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient domestic activity—the 
Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
overcome only when the domestic conduct is the “focus” of the 
statutory scheme.20 Because the focus of the Exchange Act was 
deception in connection with the sale of securities, and only the 
deception—not the sale—occurred in the United States, the 
domestic conduct was not sufficient to displace the presumption.21 
The Court continued to expand the presumption against 
 
 14. Id. at 253 (“If we were to permit possible, or even plausible, interpretations of 
language such as that involved here to override the presumption against extraterritorial 
application, there would be little left of the presumption.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 252. 
 19. Id. at 264–65. 
 20. Id. at 266. 
 21. Id. at 268–69. 
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extraterritoriality in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., which 
involved Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims by Nigerian refugees 
against British, Dutch, and Nigerian corporations for aiding and 
abetting the Nigerian government in human rights abuses.22 
Although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute and the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is a merits doctrine,23 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion stated that the principles underlying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality “similarly constrain courts 
considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.”24 
One of these underlying principles apparently was the need to 
avoid the international contention that might result when courts 
apply American law to activity occurring outside the borders of the 
United States. The presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court 
indicated, “ensure[s] that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt 
an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences 
not clearly intended by the political branches.”25 The Court 
suggested that “the danger of unwarranted judicial inference in the 
conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS,” 
since courts—not Congress—create the cause of action.26 “Since 
many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of 
new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign 
policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great 
caution.”27 The Court went on to hold that because the ATS itself 
provides no indication of extraterritoriality, all of the actors were 
foreign, and all of the relevant conduct took place in Nigeria, the 
claims did not displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.28  
Kiobel seemed to signal that the Court would apply the 
 
 22. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 23. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004). Sosa held that the ATS gives 
U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear claims based on certain violations of the law of nations, but 
does not provide a cause of action. Id. Nonetheless, it may recognize a federal common law 
cause of action to provide redress for those violations of norms of customary international law 
that are as definite as the violations originally actionable at the passage of the ATS, in 1789. Id. 
 24. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 25. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727). 
 28. Id. at 1662, 1669. The Court stated that in future ATS cases, only those claims that 
“touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption” would be successful. Id. at 1669. 
 427 Extraterritoriality as Judicial Nondelegation 
 433 
presumption against extraterritoriality to a wide range of federal 
statutes—even those to which it might not obviously pertain. RJR 
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,29 which considered whether 
RICO applied to offenses perpetrated outside the United States, 
further extended the presumption. 
RICO establishes four criminal offenses aimed at illegal 
enterprises “engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce”30 and a 
civil cause of action for “any person injured in his business or 
property by reason of a violation” of one of the criminal provisions.31 
Specifically, RICO prohibits the investment of income derived 
through a pattern of racketeering in an enterprise,32 the acquisition 
or maintenance of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering,33 
conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering,34 or 
conspiring to do any of the foregoing.35 A pattern of racketeering 
activity is a series of related predicate offenses that demonstrate the 
existence or threat of continued criminal activity and involves the 
commission of at least two predicate offenses within a ten-year 
span.36 Predicate offenses consist of various state and federal crimes, 
including wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and supporting 
foreign terrorist organizations, among many others.37 To summarize, 
a RICO violation occurs when a pattern of predicate crimes fits 
within one of the four RICO criminal offenses. RICO’s civil cause of 
action is more restrictive—it allows private plaintiffs to sue only 
when a RICO violation results in an injury to their business 
or  property.38 
In RJR Nabisco, twenty-six European countries sought to sue 
RJR Nabisco under RICO’s civil cause of action for its role in a 
foreign drug trafficking and money laundering enterprise in which 
the proceeds from the sale of drugs smuggled into Europe were used 
 
 29. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012). 
 31. § 1964(c). 
 32. § 1962(a). 
 33. § 1962(b). 
 34. § 1962(c). 
 35. § 1962(d). 
 36. § 1961(5). 
 37. § 1961(1). 
 38. § 1964(c). 
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to pay for RJR Nabisco cigarettes.39 Again invoking the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, the Court articulated a two-step framework 
based on Morrison and Kiobel: 
At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute 
gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. 
We must ask this question regardless of whether the statute in 
question regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers 
jurisdiction. If the statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second 
step we determine whether the case involves a domestic application 
of the statute, and we do this by looking to the statute’s “focus.” If 
the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United 
States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application 
even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant 
to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves 
an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other 
conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.40 
Applying this test, the Court held that Congress did intend 
RICO’s criminal provisions to apply extraterritorially, but only to the 
extent the underlying predicates overcame the presumption.41 In 
other words, the extraterritoriality of RICO predicates flows through 
to RICO offenses—if none of the predicate statutes at issue in a 
given case overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
RICO does not apply abroad by its own terms. Because the 
predicates at issue in RJR Nabisco—money laundering, wire fraud, 
mail fraud, material support of foreign terrorist organizations, and 
Travel Act violations—were extraterritorial, RICO’s substantive 
criminal provisions applied abroad in that case.42 
To the dismay of the European petitioners and many legal 
commentators, however, the Court did not stop there. Citing 
Kiobel’s holding that “the presumption . . . ‘constrain[s] courts 
 
 39. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2098 (2016). 
 40. Id. at 2101. 
 41. This unique structure, the Court observed, “ma[de] RICO the rare statute that 
clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of 
extraterritoriality.” Id. at 2103. 
 42. Id. at 2102 (“We emphasize the important limitation that foreign conduct must 
violate a predicate statute that manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply 
extraterritorially.” (internal quotations omitted)). As a result, U.S. authorities were free to 
prosecute RJR Nabisco under RICO in a criminal case. 
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considering causes of action,’” the Court held that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies not only to a statute’s substantive 
provisions, but also to the provisions that establish private rights of 
action.43 This separate extraterritoriality review, the Court reasoned, 
is required by the principles informing Kiobel—namely, the potential 
that “providing a private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a 
potential for international friction beyond that presented by merely 
applying U.S. substantive law to that foreign conduct.”44 These 
principles mandate additional scrutiny, even in cases where there is 
no risk of international discord.45 For that reason, it was immaterial 
that the petitioners—the countries where the cases against RJR 
Nabisco would otherwise be heard—expressly stipulated that 
application of U.S. law would not result in controversy.46 By 
rejecting this stipulation, the Court eschewed extraterritoriality 
review “based on a case-by-case inquiry that turns on or looks to the 
affected sovereign’s consent,”47 in favor of a categorical rule 
applicable in every case of extraterritorial flavor. 
In this second, separate extraterritoriality inquiry, the Court 
found no clear indication from Congress that RICO’s private cause 
of action ought to apply to injuries occurring outside of the United 
States.48 That the provision containing the civil cause of action 
applied only where a plaintiff suffered injury to “business or 
property” in connection with a RICO violation suggested that it was 
not coextensive with RICO’s more inclusive substantive provisions.49 
Because RICO’s private cause of action did not apply 
extraterritorially, when the petitioners were unable to prove 
a  domestic injury, they failed to overcome the presumption 
against  extraterritoriality.50 
 
 43. Id. at 2106 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 
1664  (2013)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 2100. 
 46. Id. at 2107–08. 
 47. Id. at 2095. 
 48. Id. at 2108. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 2111. 
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B. Rationales for the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
RJR Nabisco reinvigorated debate about the presumption against 
extraterritoriality that had been simmering since Aramco. Central to 
this debate are the Supreme Court’s justifications for the 
presumption. First, the Court has stated that the presumption is a 
tool for managing conduct in foreign affairs because it “serves to 
avoid the international discord that can result when United States 
law is applied to conduct in foreign countries.”51 Second, the Court 
has justified the presumption as a “commonsense notion that 
Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”52 
Third, the Court has hinted,53 the presumption preserves separation 
of powers and protects against judicial activism in foreign affairs.54 
Opponents of the presumption against extraterritoriality contend 
that the justifications advanced by the Supreme Court to defend it 
are invalid or that the presumption fails to fulfill its stated goals.55 
These critics argue that the presumption should be removed from 
the Court’s interpretative toolkit or at least diluted to better reflect 
international norms and other policy interests.56 The idea that the 
presumption efficiently reduces the risk of foreign conflict, they say, 
is flawed because international law recognizes other bases of 
jurisdiction besides territoriality, and the Court applies the 
presumption even in cases where there is obviously no possibility of 
foreign discord.57  
Critics have also lambasted the “commonsense notion” that 
Congress generally does not intend to apply extraterritorially, 
arguing that an uptick in internationally-oriented statutes and 
congressional responses to cases invoking the presumption belie this 
 
 51. Id. at 2100. 
 52. Id. As I argue in Part III, this assumption is rooted mainly in normative, structural 
values, though it does align with empirical realities in some instances. See infra note 232 and 
accompanying text. 
 53. Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. 
L. REV. 1, 16 (2014) (noting that “courts do not typically rely on separation of powers to 
justify the presumption against extraterritoriality”). 
 54. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of 
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997). 
 55. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 3; Colangelo, supra note 5, at 51. 
 56. Clopton, supra note 53, at 3. 
 57. Id. at 11. 
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justification.58 The separation-of-powers account of the presumption, 
too, has come under fire: scholars suggest that the Court has used 
the presumption to override congressional intent and ignore the 
executive “rather than stay faithful to its origins as essentially a 
separation-of-powers canon.”59 These attacks came with particular 
intensity and volume after RJR Nabisco; many felt the Court 
overstepped its bounds by applying the presumption separately to 
RICO’s private right of action.60 By adopting a default territorial 
rule, such critics have argued, the Court is merely exercising a 
territorial brand of judicial activism.61 
These criticisms raise important questions. Why does the Court 
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality even when there is 
no obvious potential for foreign conflict? Is the presumption valid if 
Congress passes statutes overriding the decisions in which it is 
invoked? Is the Court merely supplanting its own territorial 
preferences for the intent of Congress? And, in the wake of RJR 
Nabisco, why does the Court insist on applying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality separately to private rights of action when 
the related substantive statute is extraterritorial? Parts II and III 
argue that understanding the presumption against extraterritoriality 
as nondelegation resolves these and other outstanding questions 
about why the Court insists on applying the presumption 
against  extraterritoriality. 
II. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY AS 
JUDICIAL NONDELEGATION 
This Part argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
should be understood as an application of the nondelegation 
doctrine to a delegation of foreign policymaking authority from 
Congress to the judiciary. Section A provides an overview of the 
nondelegation doctrine, including its more recent manifestation in 
the narrow construction of statutory texts and describes how the 
doctrine applies to courts. Section B supports the claim that the 
 
 58. Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 236 (1993). 
 59. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 55; see also Gardner, supra note 6, at 134–35. 
 60. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 55–56. 
 61. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 143. 
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presumption against extraterritoriality should be viewed as 
nondelegation with respect to the judiciary by showing that two 
doctrines are based on similar rationales and make similar demands 
of Congress. It also highlights examples of nondelegation in the 
Supreme Court’s most recent extraterritoriality cases, responds to 
potential challenges to viewing the presumption as nondelegation, 
and discusses how the presumption may fit within the major 
questions doctrine. 
A. Nondelegation: Basic Principles 
The nondelegation doctrine rests on the recognition that the 
Constitution allocates distinct powers to each of the three branches 
of federal government: “The difference between the departments 
undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, 
and the judiciary construes the law . . . .”62 The Constitution 
allocates the legislative power to Congress,63 and the Supreme Court 
has held that “[t]he Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate 
or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which 
it is thus vested.”64 However, it is well accepted that Congress is 
empowered to delegate some matters to its coordinate branches, 
though “the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate 
and difficult inquiry.”65 The nondelegation doctrine, then, deals with 
“the standards for determining when Congress has crossed the 
constitutional line between delegating legislative authority and 
simply allowing executive and judicial actors to carry out their 
constitutionally prescribed functions.”66 
 
 62. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . .  ”). 
 64. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); see also Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“‘[T]he integrity and maintenance of the system of 
government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate 
its legislative power to another Branch.” (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892))). 
 65. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43 (“But Congress may certainly delegate to 
others, power which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”). 
 66. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 99 (7th ed. 2016). 
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1. Nondelegation as statutory interpretation 
Although the nondelegation doctrine was at one time robust,67 
its conventional application is now largely obsolete. The doctrine 
typically arises with respect to congressional delegations to 
administrative agencies; in that context, the Supreme Court allows 
delegations that have an “intelligible principle”68 and has taken a 
very broad view of what counts as such.69 The nondelegation 
doctrine lives on, however, in narrowing statutory construction: “In 
recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine 
principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, 
and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory 
delegations that might otherwise be thought to be 
unconstitutional.”70 Recognizing this trend, Professor Cass Sunstein 
has argued that nondelegation’s continued vitality lies in “a set of 
nondelegation canons, which forbid executive agencies from making 
certain decisions on their own.”71 The Court’s use of nondelegation 
canons shows that the Court “has not surrendered the principles that 
underlie the nondelegation doctrine.”72 And, as previously noted, 
those principles are fundamentally rooted in separation of 
powers  concerns. 
One of the nondelegation canons that Professor Sunstein 
identifies, albeit in the context of delegations to administrative 
 
 67. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); 
Panama Ref., 293 U.S. 388. 
 68. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
 69. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
 70. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989). For example, in The 
Benzene Case, the Court declined to follow the Government’s expansive interpretation of 
agency power under the Occupational Health and Safety Act because it “would make such a 
‘sweeping delegation of legislative power’ that it might be unconstitutional under the Court’s 
reasoning in [Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining]. A construction of the statute that 
avoids this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored.” Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. 
Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). 
 71. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000); see 
also Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 355 
(observing that there are few limits on congressional delegations to the judiciary, but that “a 
series of . . . ‘strict construction’ or ‘clear statement’ rules . . . tend to operate as nondelegation 
doctrines within their respective fields of operation.”). 
 72. Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 19, 57 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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agencies, is the presumption against extraterritoriality.73 As the Court 
established in Aramco, when it prevented the EEOC from 
unilaterally deciding that Title VII applied abroad, agencies generally 
may not decide the question of extraterritoriality.74 The presumption, 
Professor Sunstein posits, is a structurally inspired nondelegation 
canon based on the “notion . . . that extraterritorial application calls 
for extremely sensitive judgments involving international relations 
[and] such judgments must be made via the ordinary lawmaking 
process.”75 The presumption against extraterritoriality thus ensures 
that the executive branch does not make the decision of 
extraterritoriality on its own.76 
2. Nondelegation and the judiciary 
While nondelegation, including its most recent expression as an 
interpretative device, is typically applied to delegations from 
Congress to executive agencies, it applies equally to congressional 
delegations to the judiciary. As Chief Justice John Marshall 
recognized: “It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to 
the Court, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and 
exclusively legislative.”77 Despite this prohibition, delegations to the 
judiciary have largely escaped the attention of both the judiciary and 
the academy.78 This inattention is understandable, since Congress 
almost never expressly delegates its power to the judiciary. Instead of 
transferring legislative power outright, Congress typically shifts 
power to courts by passing broad statutes—the type that impliedly 
“call on courts to interpret vague statutory language or fill in 
statutory gaps in the course of case-by-case adjudication.”79 
 
 73. Sunstein, supra note 71. 
 74. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 75. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 333, 338 (“If . . . an agency is attempting on its own to 
apply domestic law extraterritorially, we might believe that whatever its expertise, it is 
inappropriate, as a matter of democratic theory and international relations, for this to happen 
unless Congress has decided that it should.”). 
 76. Id. at 333. 
 77. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). 
 78. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 407–08 (2008); see also Aaron Nielson, Erie 
as Nondelegation, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 266 (2011). 
 79. Lemos, supra note 78, at 438. 
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Nonetheless, the same separation of powers considerations that 
drive nondelegation concerns with respect to the executive branch 
also apply to delegations from Congress to the judiciary. When 
Congress passes large blocks of power to the courts, “[a]t some 
point the judicial power . . . must ‘run out’ because the delegated 
authority is just too great for the power exercised to be anything but 
purely legislative.”80 Concerns that Congress, with its superior 
political accountability, should be responsible for policymaking apply 
with even greater force where judicial delegations are concerned. “By 
constitutional design, courts are less politically accountable than both 
Congress and administrative agencies.”81 That courts lack access to 
the institutional resources necessary for making policy further weighs 
in favor of applying nondelegation principles when Congress 
delegates power to the courts.82 
This Comment connects the intuition that nondelegation 
concerns apply to delegations from Congress to the courts to the 
idea that judges enforce nondelegation through narrowing statutory 
constructions. The following sections argue that the same 
nondelegation principles served by the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in the executive agency context apply when the 
Court uses the canon to constrain the discretion of the judiciary. Just 
as traditional nondelegation cases focus on upholding Congress’ 
constitutional designation as the nation’s policymaking body, 
decisions invoking the presumption seek to preserve Congress’ 
policy-making role. When invoking the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the Court effectively rejects a broad delegation 
(intended or otherwise) of foreign relations power by declining to 
make the inherently policy-laden choice of whether to apply U.S. 
statutes abroad. By refusing to seize upon congressional silence as a 
grant of broad power that would allow the judiciary to unilaterally 
determine the extraterritorial effect of U.S. statutes, the Court 
speaks volumes about its structural role. 
 
 80. Nielson, supra note 78, at 241. 
 81. Id. at 267. 
 82. Lemos, supra note 78, at 445 (“If anything, [courts’ lack of policy expertise as 
compared to administrative agencies] suggest[s] that delegations to courts should be 
especially  disfavored.”). 
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B. Judicial Nondelegation and Extraterritoriality 
This Section argues that by applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court rejects a broad delegation of 
foreign relations power from Congress to the judiciary—the power 
to determine whether statutes apply extraterritorially. This 
characterization makes sense on several levels. First, the rationales for 
the presumption against extraterritoriality align with the purposes of 
the nondelegation doctrine. Second, both the presumption and 
nondelegation doctrine place similar demands on Congress, 
requesting guidance rather than restricting congressional power. 
Third, Supreme Court cases invoking the presumption against 
extraterritoriality are replete with evidence of nondelegation 
principles. Fourth, the presumption against extraterritoriality also fits 
the mold of a less conventional form of nondelegation—the major 
questions doctrine. These similarities provide solid evidence 
that  the  presumption against extraterritoriality embodies 
nondelegation  principles. 
1. Shared rationales 
The presumption against extraterritoriality should be understood 
as nondelegation because the two seemingly distinct doctrines are 
based on nearly identical rationales. Both doctrines are grounded in 
the notion that some policy decisions simply must be made 
by  Congress. 
On one hand, the nondelegation doctrine is a recognition that 
“the basic policy decisions governing society are to be made by the 
Legislature.”83 While Congress may delegate certain powers to other 
branches, which have their own constitutional powers, it alone can 
make “strictly and exclusively legislative” decisions.84 When Congress 
makes large delegations of power to administrative agencies, the 
modern Supreme Court uses narrowing statutory constructions to 
shift complicated policy questions back to the legislative branch.85 
Just as it uses narrowing interpretations to blunt statutory 
delegations that would transfer too much power to administrative 
 
 83. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). 
 85. See supra Section I.A. 
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agencies, the Court utilizes the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to shift the policymaking power to determine 
whether to apply U.S. law extraterritorially back to Congress. That 
is, in cases where large foreign policy consequences might result, the 
Court uses the presumption against extraterritoriality to “defer[] 
such decisions, quite appropriately, to the political branches.”86 
Indeed, the Court invokes the presumption precisely because 
policymaking by the courts poses a “danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy.”87 By preventing courts 
from unilaterally deciding the statute’s geographic scope, the 
presumption ensures Congress makes that important policy choice. 
Thus, both the nondelegation doctrine and the presumption against 
extraterritoriality protect structural values by routing policy decisions 
through the legislative process rather than the courts. 
The institutional competence considerations undergirding the 
presumption against extraterritoriality provide further evidence of its 
fit as a nondelegation principle. The Court applies the presumption 
because “[Congress] alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly 
such an important policy decision” as whether to apply a statute 
extraterritorially.88 Extending a statute outside of U.S. borders is one 
decision that requires extensive information-gathering and 
comprehensive decision-making capacities that courts simply do not 
have. The conventional nondelegation doctrine involves similar 
concerns.89 In the words of Professor Aaron Nielson: “Congress 
alone is entrusted with legislative powers because Congress alone is 
institutionally designed to use them well, and, equally significant, 
because Congress is uniquely restrained in its ability to 
abuse  them.”90 
 
 86. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 87. Id. at 1661. 
 88. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). The Court 
has routinely quoted this language in extraterritoriality decisions, indicating that it considers 
the decision of a statute’s extraterritorial application a highly sensitive policy choice. See, e.g., 
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 
248 (1991)). 
 89. See infra note 186. 
 90. Nielson, supra note 78, at 244. 
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2. Effect on Congress 
The requirements that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
imposes on Congress closely resemble those required by the Court’s 
traditional nondelegation cases. The nondelegation doctrine requires 
only that Congress articulate an “intelligible principle” when it is 
delegating power, meaning that it broadly “delineates the general 
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of 
this delegated authority.”91 The presumption against 
extraterritoriality, meanwhile, is overcome only by “the affirmative 
intention of the Congress clearly expressed.”92 In both instances, the 
judiciary’s demands on Congress are modest—supply a broad 
principle directing the use of legislative power to executive agencies 
or, in the case of the presumption, specify that a statutory provision 
should apply to foreign activity. While the two requirements are not 
identical, the differences are due largely to the differences between 
congressional delegations to agencies and courts, respectively. When 
Congress delegates to an agency, it typically indicates by statute that 
the agency has power to regulate in accordance with a specified 
standard. By contrast, delegations to the judiciary are rare,93 and 
explicit delegations are almost nonexistent. But whether the Court 
requests an intelligible principle or an indication of extraterritorial 
intent, it is doing the same thing in both cases—requesting that 
Congress supply more direction. In this sense, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality and the nondelegation doctrine impose 
similar requirements on Congress. 
3. Judicial nondelegation in the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence 
Supreme Court cases invoking the presumption against 
extraterritoriality should be understood as nondelegation cases 
because they typically involve the type of broad statutes that raise 
nondelegation concerns. The following paragraphs demonstrate how 
the Court applies the presumption against extraterritoriality to 
statutes that are natural targets for nondelegation challenges. These 
 
 91. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
 92. Benz, 353 U.S. at 147. 
 93. Lemos, supra note 78, at 444. 
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statutes are not only silent on the question of extraterritoriality, but 
frequently contain large delegations of power to the judiciary. 
 a. Aramco. The first such example is Aramco, where the 
Court held that Title VII, an employment discrimination statute, did 
not apply to discriminatory conduct occurring in Saudi Arabia.94 In 
vague, sweeping language, Title VII mandates that “[i]t shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”95 The responsibility for 
filling the many gaps left by the statute’s broad terms has fallen to 
the courts.96 Confronted with the question of whether Title VII 
applied to overseas activity, the Court invoked the presumption 
against extraterritoriality because “[w]ithout clearer evidence of 
congressional intent” it was “unwilling to ascribe to [Congress] a 
policy which would raise difficult issues of international law.”97 
Viewed through the lens of nondelegation, the Court determined 
that the decision of whether to apply a statute abroad was so policy-
heavy that its judicial interpretative powers were maxed out; to 
unilaterally extend U.S. law abroad would be to exercise 
policymaking power that the Constitution vests in Congress rather 
than courts.98 
b. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. The Court’s next 
major extraterritoriality case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd., also fits the nondelegation mold. Recall that Morrison 
considered whether the judicially created cause of action under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applied to 
 
 94. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 96. See Lemos, supra note 78, at 429 n.122 and accompanying text. 
 97. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 
1659, 1664 (2013) (invoking the presumption to “ensure that the Judiciary does not 
erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not 
clearly intended by the political branches” (citations omitted)). 
 98. Note that Aramco is typically understood as applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to restrict the executive branch’s ability to make the decision of 
extraterritoriality unilaterally. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 71, at 316. Still, the case can also 
be understood as restricting a delegation to the judiciary; given Title VII’s broad terms, the 
lack of direction on the question of extraterritoriality might be viewed as a congressional 
invitation for judicial policy making—in other words, a delegation. 
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extraterritorial conduct.99 Once again, section 10(b) involves broad, 
vague language.100 A major reason that the Court applied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality was to avoid the shortfalls of 
the open-ended tests lower courts had used in evaluating the 
extraterritoriality of 10(b). These tests—“complex in formulation 
and unpredictable in application”—focused largely on divining what 
Congress would have wanted if it had considered the question of 
extraterritoriality.101 By guessing at Congress’ intent, Morrison 
suggests, lower courts were merely making foreign policy choices 
under the guise of interpreting congressional intent. According to 
the majority, the confusion and unpredictability that resulted from 
this judicial lawmaking “demonstrate[d] the wisdom of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.”102 
Morrison’s concern with the indeterminacy of lower court 
extraterritoriality tests evinces the Court’s preoccupation with the 
same structural considerations that motivate the nondelegation 
doctrine. The Court was not so much concerned with whether 
section 10(b) should apply extraterritorially, but whether Congress 
had in fact designated it as an extraterritorial statute. Just as in 
nondelegation cases, where the Court ensures that Congress does 
not delegate pure policymaking authority to another branch, 
Morrison shows a profound concern with lower-court tests under 
which judges were “essentially resolving matters of policy.”103 That 
the Court focused less on the policy choice itself and more on the 
body making the policy choice suggests that the presumption is an 
expression of nondelegation. 
c. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In Kiobel, too, the 
Court’s use of the presumption against extraterritoriality comports 
with nondelegation principles. The Kiobel Court was tasked with 
 
 99. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange— . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”). 
 101. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010). 
 102. Id. at 261. 
 103. Id. at 259. 
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determining whether the ATS applies to torts occurring outside the 
United States.104 The ATS, enacted by the first Congress in 1789, 
states: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”105 The statute is 
jurisdictional only and does not create a cause of action;106 its brevity 
leaves many details in question.107 Like Congress’ short, sweeping 
directions in Title VII and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the 
ATS is a fitting example of a broad delegation from Congress to the 
judiciary. And, again, it is a statute to which the Court has applied 
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
In Kiobel, the Court held that although the ATS has no 
substantive provisions, “the principles underlying the canon of 
interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of action 
that may be brought under the ATS.”108 The “principles” to which 
the Court refers are the need for courts to avoid the “danger of 
unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy”109 
and the risk of “impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”110 As authority for 
these principles, Kiobel cited Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which has 
been highlighted as an example of the Court adopting narrowing 
statutory construction to avoid nondelegation issues.111 In Sosa, the 
Court declined to afford courts free reign to recognize causes of 
action under the ATS and instead cabined such causes of action to 
norms of international law “defined with a specificity comparable to 
 
 104. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 106. The ATS “does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief. It instead allows 
federal courts to recognize certain causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of 
international law.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 107. Though used several times in the United States’ early history, the statute fell into 
disuse to such a degree that Judge Friendly called it a “legal Lohengrin” because “no one 
seem[ed] to know whence it came.” See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d 
Cir.  1975). 
 108. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)); see also Paul B. 
Stephan, Private Litigation as a Foreign Relations Problem, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 40, 
43 (2016). 
 111. Nielson, supra note 78, at 289. 
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the features” of those that existed when the ATS was passed.112 It did 
so, at least partly, because courts “have no congressional mandate 
to  seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law 
of  nations.”113 
By invoking these same concerns about the role of courts vis-à-
vis the political branches in Kiobel, the Court signals that the 
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality are 
the same nondelegation concerns it expresses in Sosa. Both Sosa and 
Kiobel involve “a common nondelegation move”—giving a statute a 
narrow construction in order to avoid nondelegation issues.114 In 
Sosa, which involved significant domestic conduct, the Court used a 
narrowing construction based on historical evidence to confine 
judicial discretion.115 In Kiobel, it used the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. But both cases ultimately reflect judicial 
preoccupation with the same structural principle—nondelegation. 
d. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. The breadth of 
the statutes at issue in Aramco, Morrison, and Kiobel provide a useful 
and dramatic illustration of the nondelegation concerns motivating 
the Court in extraterritoriality cases. But the statute as a whole need 
not be broad or ambiguous for nondelegation concerns to apply. So 
long as Congress, by silence or otherwise, has effectively delegated a 
momentous policy choice to the judiciary, the same structural 
concerns are present. The Court’s opinion in RJR Nabisco implicitly 
suggests that the Court considers the question of extraterritoriality 
alone a large enough policy choice to warrant a narrowing 
construction of the statute by way of the presumption. Because the 
decision to allow private parties to sue is effectively a separate policy 
choice that carries separate foreign affairs consequences, the Court’s 
nondelegation concerns do not dissipate when Congress has 
expressed an intent to apply a statute’s substantive provisions abroad. 
Thus, even though RICO’s provisions are quite detailed when 
compared to statutes in other presumption-against-extraterritoriality 
 
 112. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. 
 113. Id. at 728. 
 114. Nielson, supra note 78, at 289. 
 115. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (“[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the 
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized 
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms 
we have recognized.”). 
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cases,116 Congress’ silence regarding the extraterritorial application of 
RICO’s private right of action still delegates a significant policy 
decision to the courts. By applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court adopts a narrowing statutory 
construction to rebuff that delegation. 
e. Apparent inconsistencies. It may be argued that these examples 
cut against considering the presumption against extraterritoriality as 
nondelegation since courts have previously accepted the invitation to 
fill gaps in the substantive provisions of several of these statutes when 
applied to domestic parties and conduct. For example, Title VII’s 
broad language has left room for significant judicial innovation.117 
Similarly, several justices have described the cause of action implied 
from section 10(b) as “a judicial oak which has grown from little 
more than a legislative acorn.”118 If the Supreme Court is willing to 
fill in substantive provisions—which undoubtedly involve at least 
some policy choices—in the domestic context, why would it shy 
away from making the policy choice of whether to apply the statute 
extraterritorially? This was essentially the argument of Justice 
Stevens’ Morrison concurrence, which challenged the Court’s 
reluctance to engage in case-by-case reasoning on the question of 
extraterritorial application when the “entire area of law [surrounding 
section 10(b)] is replete with judge-made rules, which give concrete 
meaning to Congress’ general commands.”119 In light of the 
apparent discrepancy between the Supreme Court’s interpretive 
approach for foreign and domestic applications of the same statutes, 
it might seem that the presumption against extraterritoriality does 
not embody nondelegation principles.  
There are at least two possible explanations for this apparent 
inconsistency. First, the Supreme Court may treat the question of 
whether to apply a law extraterritorially differently because of its 
 
 116. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 78, at 430, 433; Laura P. Moyer & Holley Tankersley, 
Judicial Innovation and Sexual Harassment Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 65 POL. 
RES. Q. 784, 784 (2012) (noting that “lack of legislative guidance” in Title VII led to judicial 
policy-making). 
 118. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 276 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
737 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.)). 
 119. Id. 
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impact on foreign affairs. As previously argued, the Court has 
signaled that the question of extraterritoriality is a sufficiently 
momentous foreign policy decision that it triggers nondelegation 
concerns by itself.120 Even if the question of extraterritoriality alone 
were not sufficient to warrant nondelegation scrutiny, the Court has 
historically been reticent to resolve matters of foreign affairs, 
preferring to leave such matters to the political branches.121 Indeed, 
concern about the judiciary “run[ning] interference in . . . a delicate 
field of international relations”122 is one of the Court’s primary 
justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality. When 
there is a broad grant of policymaking authority to the judiciary and 
the interpretive question involves foreign affairs, the combination of 
these factors may bump the issue over the nondelegation threshold.  
In other words, even if no nondelegation concerns arise when 
courts fill gaps with respect to a particular statute’s domestic 
application, there may still be nondelegation problems when courts 
are asked both to fill gaps and make sensitive foreign policy 
decisions. Under this understanding, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality reflects nondelegation principles because it protects 
the division of power established by the Constitution, which “assigns 
principal policymaking authority, as well as principal authority over 
foreign affairs, to the legislative and executive branches rather than 
to the judicial branch.”123  
The second explanation is that the Court has pivoted away from 
the type of broad, judicial gap-filling that was previously the norm. 
In other words, the apparent inconsistency in viewing the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as judicial nondelegation when 
the Court has previously filled gaps in domestic applications of the 
same statutes may boil down to a shift in the Court’s view about 
judicial gap-filling,124 especially where extraterritoriality is concerned. 
 
 120. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 121. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
 122. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). 
 123. Bradley, supra note 54, at 516. 
 124. See, for example, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), where the Court 
declined to imply a private cause of action for section 602 of Title VI because “[l]ike 
substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by 
Congress.” Id. at 286. The Court had previously implied a cause of action to the adjacent 
section 601 of Title VI, Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979), but “[h]aving sworn 
off the habit of venturing beyond Congress’s intent, [it would] not accept [the] invitation to 
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For example, the majority in Morrison countered Justice Stevens’s 
observations about judge-made rules125 by pointing out that court 
rulings in section 10(b) cases had resulted in widespread confusion: 
“The results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what 
Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation 
before the court—demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.”126 
In addition to its reluctance to undertake extraterritoriality 
inquiries with little statutory guidance in other contexts, the 
Supreme Court may also be rethinking whether the presumption 
against extraterritoriality should not apply to antitrust cases. The 
Sherman Act is arguably the best example of a broad delegation of 
policymaking power from Congress to courts,127 a delegation courts 
have accepted wholeheartedly. And unlike Title VII and section 
10(b), the presumption against extraterritoriality apparently does not 
apply to antitrust suits under the Sherman Act.128 This, however, may 
be changing. Justice Alito’s opinion in RJR Nabisco casts doubt on 
the rationales articulated in antitrust cases decided “before we honed 
our extraterritoriality jurisprudence in Morrison and Kiobel.”129 
Although Justice Alito was discussing cases interpreting the Clayton 
Act rather than the Sherman Act, his opinion suggests that recent 
developments in the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence may 
 
have one last drink.” Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287; see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“Not only is it “far better” for Congress to so specify when it 
intends private litigants to have a cause of action, but . . . this Court in the future should be 
extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the 
Legislative Branch.”). 
 125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 126. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010). 
 127. Lemos, supra note 78, at 461. Professor Lemos notes that the Sherman Act’s 
legislative history suggests that Congress intended courts to fill in the contours of the statute 
in the common law tradition. 
 128. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, 
J.,  dissenting). 
 129. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2110 (2016). Justice Alito’s 
response to an argument that RICO should be interpreted similarly to the Clayton Act, since 
Congress modeled RICO after the Clayton Act, suggests that the modern presumption may 
conflict with past interpretations of antitrust statutes. In Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 
434 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1978), the Court had allowed India to sue under the Clayton Act for 
extraterritorial conduct. Justice Alito observed that Pfizer was decided before the Court had 
“honed” its presumption against extraterritorially jurisprudence, implying that analogy to 
Pfizer was unpersuasive. 
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have altered the playing field for future antitrust cases. This is 
especially true given that Justice Alito cites private antitrust suits as a 
source of “considerable controversy in other nations.”130 Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire also seemed to hint at 
this possibility; if not for the Supreme Court precedent on point, 
which he begrudgingly followed, Scalia would have applied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.131 These indications suggest 
the Court may not have had its final say on the presumption in 
relation to antitrust cases.132 This in turn provides further evidence 
that the Supreme Court’s willingness to accept congressional 
invitations to fill large gaps in broad statutes may be decreasing, at 
least where questions of extraterritoriality are implicated. 
4. The presumption against extraterritoriality and “major questions”  
The presumption against extraterritoriality might also be 
considered nondelegation through the “major questions” doctrine. 
The basic idea of the major questions doctrine—a species of 
nondelegation—is that some questions are simply too important for 
Congress to delegate to another branch, particularly when the 
delegation is purportedly accomplished through inauspicious 
statutory language. Put differently, the Court gives narrowing 
constructions in cases that “both (1) involve a ‘fundamental’ or 
‘extraordinary’ expansion of regulatory authority and (2) are based 
on a ‘vague or ancillary’ statutory provision.”133 The Supreme Court 
has invoked this doctrine to give a narrowing construction to 
congressional delegations to executive agencies in a variety of famous 
cases,134 including Whitman v. American Trucking,135 FDA v. Brown 
& Williams Tobacco Corp.,136 Gonzales v. Oregon,137 and King v. 
 
 130. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2016 (internal quotations omitted). 
 131. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 132. Of course, any reconsideration of whether the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies to the Sherman Act would necessarily involve interpreting Congress’ extraterritorial 
intent as expressed in the Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§  6a  (2012). 
 133. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 72, at 22. 
 134. Id. at 10, 37. 
 135. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 136. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 137. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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Burwell.138 In essence, the Court avoids an expansive interpretation 
of statutory text that does not clearly contemplate the expansive 
result. For example, the Supreme Court did not give Chevron 
deference to the FDA’s interpretation of the term “drug” as 
including nicotine because the power to regulate the entire tobacco 
industry was so large that Congress could not have intended to 
delegate it to the FDA through a single word.139 
The presumption against extraterritoriality might be viewed as an 
application of the major questions doctrine to congressional 
delegations to the judiciary. When it employs the presumption, the 
Court could be seen as holding that the question of extraterritorial 
application is simply too large a policy decision to be delegated to 
courts through congressional silence. Congress, the Court might 
assume, simply would not hide the “elephant” of extraterritoriality in 
the “mousehole” of silence or ambiguous text. 
Of course, the major questions doctrine has been criticized for its 
indeterminacy and amenability to judicial manipulation: “One 
judge’s mouse is another judge’s elephant, and it ever will be so.”140 
Although this assessment is a valid critique of the major questions 
doctrine as applied to executive agencies, the problem 
of  indeterminacy is less acute in the narrow context of 
extraterritoriality.141 Most cases invoking the major questions 
doctrine do so on an ad hoc and idiosyncratic basis—courts use the 
doctrine to narrow the language of a single statute in a way unlikely 
to be replicated for other statutes. The extraterritoriality inquiry, on 
the other hand, is an overarching question that recurs across a 
number of different statutes. In essence, the Supreme Court has 
categorically indicated that the question of extraterritoriality, either 
for a statute’s substantive provisions or private cause of action, is 
always a major question. While the decision to label extraterritoriality 
 
 138. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) 
 139. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 133 (“[W]e must be guided to a degree 
by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of 
such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.”). 
 140. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 72, at 23. 
 141. See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 341 (noting that nondelegation canons like the 
presumption against extraterritoriality “do not require judges to resolve a hard issue about 
degree (how much discretion is too much discretion?) and allow judges instead to draw clear 
lines (for example, if the statute is ambiguous, it may not be applied extraterritorially)”). 
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as a major question in the first place may be subject to scrutiny, the 
doctrine can be consistently applied after that threshold decision. In 
this sense, the presumption-against-extraterritoriality brand of the 
major questions doctrine results not in unpredictable judicial cherry 
picking, but a “stable background against which Congress can 
legislate with predictable effects.”142 
In sum, the presumption against extraterritoriality should be 
understood as an incarnation of nondelegation principles. Both 
interpretive tools are based on the fundamental premise that 
Congress cannot delegate certain legislative authority to other 
branches of government for structural and institutional competence 
reasons. Both place minimal demands on Congress—requesting a 
modicum of guidance rather than limiting congressional power per 
se. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent presumption-against-
extraterritoriality cases bear the hallmarks of nondelegation 
and  fit  comfortably within alternative formulations of the 
nondelegation  doctrine. 
III. EXTANT EXTRATERRITORIALITY PUZZLES AND NONDELEGATION 
Unsurprisingly, the Court’s use of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has sparked significant discussion in academic 
circles. The vast majority of the commentary, especially regarding 
recent cases, has been negative. Critics have challenged the 
presumption as a crude tool for managing foreign affairs and 
understanding congressional intent. They also dispute the canon’s 
efficacy as a separation-of-powers tool, suggesting that the Court 
overrides legislative intent, cuts the executive out of the 
extraterritorial equation, and demands too much of Congress when 
it applies the presumption separately to a statute’s substantive 
provisions and private cause of action. These alleged deficiencies can 
ultimately be explained by viewing the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as a principle of nondelegation. Specifically, the 
nondelegation understanding makes sense of why the Court (A) 
applies the presumption in cases devoid of foreign controversy, 
(B) describes the presumption as a “commonsense” view of 
congressional intent, (C) is not exercising judicial activism, (D) 
 
 142. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010). 
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applies the presumption to causes of action underlying jurisdictional 
statutes, and (E) has not adopted alternatives to the presumption. 
A. Nondelegation and Foreign Conflict  
The need to avoid unintended foreign conflicts is a recurring 
theme in presumption-against-extraterritoriality cases. The Supreme 
Court has stated that it invokes the presumption in cases where 
congressional intent is ambiguous to “protect against unintended 
clashes between [U.S.] laws and those of other nations.”143 “Risk of 
conflict,” the Court has said, brings “the need to enforce the 
presumption [to] its apex,” especially with respect to private suits. 
But as the Court itself acknowledges, “risk of conflict between [an] 
American statute and a foreign law is not a prerequisite for applying 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.”144 
1. Overinclusivity and nondelegation 
Seizing on this apparent anomaly, a number of scholars have 
questioned why a canon used to prevent foreign conflict applies 
where such conflict is clearly impossible. Professor Zachary Clopton, 
for example, argues the presumption is overinclusive and therefore 
poorly tailored to the role of preventing conflict with foreign laws.145 
For this proposition, he cites Smith v. United States, where the 
Supreme Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to 
a tort claim based on conduct occurring on a scientific expedition in 
Antarctica, which has no law and is governed by no foreign 
sovereign.146 The result in Smith, Clopton implies, demonstrates the 
absurdity of the presumption as a means for managing foreign 
 
 143. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also RJR Nabisco, 
Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (stating that the presumption “serves 
to avoid the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in 
foreign countries”). Note that this rationale emphasizes the potential for conflicts with foreign 
law (the laws of foreign states), rather than international law, which, in the context of 
extraterritoriality, typically means customary international law. See Clopton, supra note 53, 
at  11. 
 144. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107 (internal quotations omitted). 
 145. Clopton, supra note 53, at 5, 11, 16 (arguing that “the cases to which courts have 
applied the presumption demand more than a one-size-fits-all response”). 
  146. Id. at 11 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 199 (1993)). 
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conflict.147 He further argues that because international law principles 
of prescriptive jurisdiction allow jurisdiction on bases besides 
territoriality, the presumption is unduly restrictive.148 Echoing these 
sentiments, Professor Carlos Vasquez claims that the current vision 
of extraterritoriality “significantly overprotects the interest in 
international comity,”149 while Professor Larry Kramer contends that 
“before restricting American law to avoid conflicts with foreign law, 
[the Court] should make sure that there is a conflict.”150 In short, 
these scholars protest that the presumption is needlessly conciliatory 
to foreign interests. 
It is undoubtedly true that the strict presumption against 
extraterritoriality is overbroad in its aversion to foreign conflict. This 
result, however, is not merely an unintended consequence of a 
haphazardly drawn bright line rule. Rather, it is the result required 
by the nondelegation doctrine. Adopting an interpretation that 
would extend the force of U.S. law to the territory of another 
sovereign is unquestionably a policy choice, regardless of whether 
international law allows the result. As the Court has expressly 
recognized, questions of foreign policy “should be directed to the 
Congress rather than to us.”151 Although the Supreme Court’s 
decision to draw the default line of statutory application at the 
United States’ territorial borders may seem arbitrary, it is the only 
decision that effectively minimizes the Court’s policymaking role. Ad 
hoc approaches,152 a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality,153 and 
even the Charming Betsy canon (considered alone)154 would all 
require the Court to decide by itself whether an ambiguous statute 
should apply abroad. That choice oozes policy in a field—foreign 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 11, 24. 
 149. Carlos M. Vasquez, Out-Beale-ing Beale, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 68, 
69  (2016). 
 150. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 
SUP. CT. REV. 179, 217 (1991). 
 151. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 
22  (1963). 
 152. See infra Section III.E.2. 
 153. See Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 659–70 (1990) (proposing a 
presumption in favor of extraterritoriality). 
 154. See infra Section III.E.1. 
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relations—the Court has described as “committed by the 
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—
Departments of the Government.”155 
While the Court often does frame its justifications for the 
presumption in terms of foreign affairs, it is quick to recognize that 
it is guarding against unintended consequences that courts simply do 
not have the institutional capacity to foresee. In Benz v. Compania 
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., for example, the Supreme Court refused to 
apply a U.S. labor statute to a dispute between a foreign ship and its 
foreign crew because, when it came to the question of 
extraterritoriality, “[Congress] alone ha[d] the facilities necessary to 
make fairly such an important policy decision.”156 This is a 
nondelegation argument. That the Court applies the presumption in 
all cases, even those where no foreign conflict appears, shows that 
the focus is on the decision-making body. Thus, the presumption 
does not reflect concern about the foreign policy outcome in a 
particular case, but rather the Court’s structural judgment that the 
Constitution assigns policy choices of this type to the political 
branches. In turn, it reflects the intuition that following that 
structural allocation is likely to produce desirable, or at least 
democratically sustainable, foreign policy results as a byproduct. 
The nondelegation paradigm thus provides an explanation for 
the presumption’s supposed foreign affairs problem. The Court 
applies the presumption in all cases, even those where foreign 
conflict is not a bona fide issue because the decision of 
extraterritorial application is, categorically, a policy decision Congress 
should make. Of course, labeling the extraterritoriality question as a 
policy choice in cases that do not involve foreign conflict may, on the 
surface, seem to beg the question. After all, the policy element 
would seem to disappear where no ostensible foreign conflict is 
immediately salient. But cases occurring in the territory of another 
sovereign inevitably involve foreign relations even if they do not 
involve foreign conflict. Even if a court concludes that applying a 
statute abroad would raise no foreign relations problems, that 
conclusion is itself a foreign policy decision that judges should not 
make. On a practical level, courts’ inability to make holistic decisions 
 
 155. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). 
 156. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 138–39, 146–47 (1957). 
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may prevent them from foreseeing all of the consequences of foreign 
policy decisions.157 In other words, the problem is not that each case 
is necessarily sensitive per se, but that foreign affairs cases as a 
category involve sensitive choices.  
Thus, even where practical obstacles dissipate, the structural 
prohibition on judicial lawmaking remains to prevent lower courts 
from getting too close to the foreign-affairs abyss. Because the 
Supreme Court cannot decide which cases come before lower courts 
or review every extraterritoriality decision, it enforces nondelegation 
principles the only way it can—by erecting territorial boundaries that 
fence out judicial policymaking “across the board.”158 The line the 
court draws is a strict one, but it helps discourage ad hoc 
judicial diplomacy.  
Of course, one might argue that courts can simply use traditional 
judicial tools to decide whether a statue applies extraterritorially so 
that the question of geographic scope is not a policy question at all, 
but an interpretative one. Under this view, the Court would not be 
exercising legislative power, but would be determining what 
Congress would have wanted had it considered the issue. (Recall that 
the presumption applies only to ambiguous statutes, so if Congress 
had provided indicia of extraterritorial intent, the presumption 
would be inapposite.) The problem with this approach is that when 
courts are asked to divine congressional intent from silence or 
ambiguous statutory language, they inevitably default to “resolving 
matters of policy.”159 This is precisely the issue the Court seeks to 
remedy with the presumption—“Rather than guess anew in each 
case, we apply the presumption in all cases.”160 
2. Underinclusivity and nondelegation 
Critics also suggest that the underinclusivity of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality makes it inadequate as a foreign relations 
tool. Writing in dissent in RJR Nabisco, Justice Ginsburg argued that 
 
   157. See infra Section III.E.4. 
 158. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (“We 
therefore apply the presumption across the board, regardless of whether there is a risk of 
conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.”) (internal quotations and 
citations  omitted). 
 159. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 259 (2010). 
 160. Id. at 261. 
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barring foreign claims may increase international friction because 
making causes of action “available to domestic but not foreign 
plaintiffs is hardly solicitous of international comity or respectful of 
foreign interests.”161 In accord with Justice Ginsburg’s views, 
Professor John Knox argues that failure to enforce U.S. law may 
create “underregulated zones,” and thereby anger foreign powers.162 
The risk of offending other nations by failing to enforce laws is 
particularly acute in cases where the United States has prescriptive 
jurisdiction to adjudicate norms of international law.163 What’s more, 
the presumption may fail to prevent conflicts with foreign powers 
that claim the right to apply their law based on notions of 
prescriptive jurisdiction other than territoriality, such as nationality.164 
Indeed, “there may be situations in which a permissible application 
of U.S. law to foreign conduct might nevertheless create 
jurisdictional conflict.”165 
As with concerns about an overbroad canon, however, these 
arguments are ultimately unavailing. Even if the presumption against 
extraterritoriality may result in foreign conflict, the policy decision to 
extend U.S. law to events occurring in a foreign country involves a 
policy choice that courts are not well-suited to make. In any given 
case, a foreign nation may argue for or against the application of 
U.S. law. The immense difficulty of assessing the gravity of the 
situation based on litigation briefs shows why courts are best served 
by declining to venture into the labyrinth of foreign policymaking.166 
Although the result may offend foreign nations, the situation is 
better left to the political branches. 
In addition, because the question of extraterritoriality is one of 
nondelegation, consent of a foreign sovereign does not mitigate the 
concerns underlying the presumption. The choice still is not the 
 
 161. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Kiobel, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should treat this Nation’s interest in not becoming 
a safe harbor for violators of the most fundamental international norms as an important 
jurisdiction-related interest justifying application of [U.S. law].”). 
 162. John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 
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 163. See Clopton, supra note 53, at 12, 25. 
 164. Id. at 12. 
 165. Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Scope and Limitations of the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 62, 66 (2016). 
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judiciary’s to make. The political branches might wish to avoid 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law in a foreign country—even 
when welcomed by the foreign nation—for diplomatic reasons 
unknown to the judiciary and unamenable to publication in an 
amicus brief. Or, as the Court suggested in Kiobel, foreign nations 
might respond by “haul[ing] our citizens into their courts” for 
conduct occurring in the United States or other foreign countries.167 
The point here is not the exact type of foreign affairs consequences 
that might result, but that courts are not the body the Constitution 
designates to evaluate such consequences. 
3. The presumption and domestic connections 
Of course, the question of extraterritoriality does not arise only 
in purely foreign cases, “[f]or it is a rare case of prohibited 
extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of 
the United States.”168 The Court has affirmed that the presumption 
is implicated even in cases where some of the relevant conduct or 
effects occur in the United States. In the inimitable words of Justice 
Scalia, “the presumption against extraterritorial application would be 
a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some 
domestic activity is involved in the case.”169 One might claim that 
this approach is too restrictive because the United States likely has 
grounds for jurisdiction under international law; the domestic 
connection, it would seem, should avert foreign conflict.170 
Again, understanding the presumption as nondelegation sheds 
light on this question. While scholars have typically assumed Justice 
Scalia’s watchdog is on the lookout for foreign affairs conflicts,171 this 
seems unlikely given that Morrison mentions international conflict 
only as an afterthought.172 Indeed, Justice Scalia justifies the 
 
 167. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) 
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 169. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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 171. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 7. 
 172. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (pointing to the “probability of incompatibility with 
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presumption primarily in terms of its superiority to the 
indeterminate, policy-oriented tests used by lower courts to assess 
the extraterritoriality of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.173 This 
suggests that the watchdog to which Justice Scalia refers is charged 
not merely with standing guard against foreign conflict but also with 
protecting the balance of structural powers mandated by the 
Constitution. Because the decision to apply a statute extraterritorially 
involves enormous foreign policy power, even when the case involves 
domestic elements (as most foreign affairs cases do), the Court must 
apply the presumption. In doing so, it appropriately refuses a large 
delegation of power to determine whether to enforce a statute 
outside the borders of the United States. 
B. Nondelegation, the Presumption, and Congressional Intent 
Another common justification for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is the “commonsense notion that Congress 
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”174 This basic 
rationale is the essence of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality—the Court assumes that all statutes begin from a 
domestic baseline. Although some call this the only legitimate 
rationale for the presumption,175 many academics contend 
the  presumption is not, in reality, a good proxy for 
congressional  intent.176 
As evidence of this view, some point to congressional responses 
to cases that invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality. For 
example, one year after Aramco, where the Supreme Court held that 
Title VII’s employment discrimination protections did not apply to 
conduct occurring in Saudi Arabia, Congress amended the statute to 
apply abroad in certain cases.177 The congressional response to 
 
 173. Id. at 258–59 (“There is no more damning indictment of the conduct and effects 
test than the Second Circuit’s own declaration that the presence or absence of any single factor 
which was considered in other cases . . . is not necessarily dispositive in future cases.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 174. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 175. Dodge, supra note 10, at 123. 
 176. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 17 (“[I]f the presumption is intended to respect 
the decisions of the political branches—legislative and executive—it needs work.”). 
 177. Act of Nov. 21, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077–78; 
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Morrison came even faster—only one month after the Court applied 
the presumption against extraterritoriality to 10(b) actions, Congress 
specified that the government (but not private plaintiffs) had power 
to prosecute foreign securities fraud.178 In the eyes of the 
presumption’s detractors, these legislative responses show that the 
canon “does not always hit Congress’s mark.”179 Critics also argue 
that when Congress does consider whether to apply U.S. law abroad, 
it does not adopt the avenue that would avoid conflict with foreign 
law. As Professor Dodge explains, “avoiding conflict with foreign law 
does not seem to rank very high on Congress’s list of priorities.”180 
Others, such as Professor Lea Brilmayer, observe that in most cases 
Congress does not consider questions of extraterritoriality and “ha[s] 
no actual intent on territorial reach.”181 
Understanding the presumption against extraterritoriality as an 
application of the nondelegation doctrine harmonizes the seeming 
mismatch between the presumption and congressional intent. The 
nondelegation paradigm suggests that the presumption’s 
“commonsense” assumption about congressional intent is normative, 
not descriptive. That is, because of the nondelegation concerns that 
would arise if courts were tasked with making policy decisions about 
the geographic scope of the seemingly numberless federal statutes 
that are silent as to extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court assumes 
Congress legislates domestically. Just as in recent conventional 
nondelegation cases, the Court, in effect, assumes that Congress 
does not intend this result because “such a ‘sweeping delegation of 
legislative power’ . . . might be unconstitutional” under the 
nondelegation doctrine.182 In this sense, the “commonsense notion” 
is grounded more in the Court’s views about its own role in deciding 
 
Clopton, supra note 53, at 14. 
 178. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65 
(2010); Clopton, supra note 53, at 14. 
 179. Clopton, supra note 53, at 15. 
 180. Dodge, supra note 10, at 116. 
 181. Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 
392, 393 (1980); see also Pamela K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110 
AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 57, 61 (2016) (arguing that the presumption does not “track[] 
congressional intent . . . [because] it keeps raising the hurdle that Congress must clear in order 
to rebut it”). 
 182. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum. Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 
646 (1980). 
 427 Extraterritoriality as Judicial Nondelegation 
 463 
cases than in attempting to empirically estimate a purely hypothetical 
congressional intent.183 
Moreover, congressional reaction to cases invoking the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is not troubling when 
considered in terms of nondelegation. Congressional responses show 
only that Congress knows how to express extraterritorial intent184 
and does so in a much more detailed fashion than would courts 
faced with the same question.185 In this sense, these legislative 
rebuttals merely demonstrate that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is fulfilling its function as a nondelegation canon by 
forcing democratic action.186 Courts invoking the presumption 
engage in an institutional dialogue with Congress, brokered by the 
nondelegation principles that the presumption embodies. A court 
applying the presumption essentially requests that Congress provide 
more detail about the terms of a statute, rather than attempting to 
divine those details from whole cloth. When Congress responds, it 
may apply the statute abroad, but it supplies the details necessary for 
extraterritorial application. 
When Congress does supply these details, the statutes it passes 
tend to provide more specific guidance than the open-ended, multi-
factor balancing tests courts seem to favor.187 For example, when 
Congress amended Title VII in response to Aramco, it specified that 
Title VII did not apply to foreign conduct by companies not 
 
 183. This view is corroborated by defenses of interpretive canons generally. See Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role 
of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 509 (1998) (“[T]he contemporary defense of 
[interpretive canons] has shifted from empirical claims regarding legislative intent to a focus on 
substantive and institutional values. Under this framework, statutory interpretation ceases to be 
solely a problem of discovering meaning, [and instead] becomes an issue of institutional 
competence and authority.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
 184. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (noting that 
congressional action to clarify the extraterritorial reach of Title VII after Aramco only 
“shows . . . that Congress knows how to give a statute explicit extraterritorial effect—and how 
to limit that effect to particular applications”). 
 185. This difference in detail reflects the differing institutional competencies of Congress 
and the judiciary. 
 186. See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 317 (noting that nondelegation canons like the 
presumption against extraterritoriality “represent a salutary kind of democracy-forcing 
minimalism, designed to ensure that certain choices are made by an institution with a superior 
democratic pedigree”). 
 187. Bradley, supra note 54, at 554. 
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controlled by U.S. shareholders.188 As Professor Bradley observes, 
this succinct answer to a complicated extraterritoriality question is 
much different from the approach courts would likely supply.189 By 
enforcing nondelegation principles in a way that compels Congress 
to act, the presumption against extraterritoriality ultimately results in 
the best approximation of congressional intent—the one Congress 
itself provides.190 
The presumption’s detractors argue that its ability to inspire 
congressional action is significantly dulled by the impediments of the 
legislative process. Because legislative inertia and veto-gates prevent 
Congress from easily amending statutes in response to judicial 
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality,191 the 
argument goes, the Court expects too much of Congress when it 
requires a clear indication of extraterritorial intent.192 But as critics of 
the presumption themselves point out, Congress has responded to 
two of the Court’s four major recent extraterritoriality cases.193 At a 
minimum, this suggests Congress can respond to some applications 
of the presumption.  
Even assuming the legislative process poses insurmountable 
difficulties, however, this means only that extraterritorial application 
of the statute is not sufficiently important to warrant congressional 
action. In the words of Professor Sunstein, “there is nothing to 
lament about a situation in which . . . statutes may not be applied 
 
 188. Id. at 552–53. 
 189. Id. at 555. 
 190. It is worth noting that because the Court only applies the presumption when 
Congress is silent as to a statute’s extraterritoriality and has declined to divine congressional 
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extraterritoriality, but are criticisms of interpretive canons generally. See Bradley, supra note 
183, at 505–07. 
 193. See supra note 178 and accompanying discussion. 
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. . . extraterritorially, without congressional authorization, and in 
which Congress is unable to muster the will to give that 
authorization.”194 And while Congress may not, as a practical matter, 
respond perfectly to every extraterritoriality question,195 it is certainly 
better equipped to make the complex policy decision than courts 
deciding issues on an ad hoc basis. 
In sum, arguments that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a poor barometer of congressional intent are 
significantly less problematic when one considers the presumption in 
nondelegation terms. Not only do the normative nondelegation 
values at the heart of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
explain the “commonsense notion” that Congress legislates with 
domestic issues in mind, they are also likely to prompt Congress to 
clarify its intent with respect to extraterritoriality in important cases. 
C. The Presumption and Accusations of Judicial Activism 
Closely related to the aforementioned arguments that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is a bad proxy for 
congressional intent are allegations that the Supreme Court employs 
the presumption in order to override the intent of the political 
branches. These accusations challenge the presumption’s viability as 
a separation-of-powers canon,196 alleging that it enables the judiciary 
to flout the views of Congress and the executive in favor of 
judicially-preferred ends, such as enforcing territorialism and limiting 
private rights of action. Viewing the presumption against 
 
 194. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 339; see also Nielson, supra note 78, at 264–65 
(“[W]hile ‘the nondelegation principle seems to raise the burdens and costs associated with the 
enactment of federal law,’ and so ‘may create a “status quo bias” . . ., these “burdens and 
costs” can also be seen as “an important guarantor of individual liberty, because they ensure 
that national governmental power may not be brought to bear against individuals without a 
consensus, established by legislative agreement . . . .”’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Loshin 
& Nielson, supra note 72, at 55)). 
 195. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 142 (arguing that Congress may have introduced 
unintended error with the poorly drafted statutory response to Morrison). 
 196. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 51–52 (contending that the presumption, as presently 
constituted, “allow[s] the Court complete discretion to ignore congressional directives” and is 
not “faithful to its origins as essentially a separation-of-powers canon designed to effectuate 
legislative supremacy and judicial modesty”); see also Gardner, supra note 6, at 143 (arguing 
that “the presumption has run away from its stated purpose” and that “the Supreme Court 
poses as a faithful agent of congressional intent, but it is in fact a disciplinarian of Congress’s 
global aspirations”). 
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extraterritoriality through the lens of nondelegation reveals that the 
Court is not bent on territorialism nor biased against private 
litigants, but determined to ensure that—to the maximum extent 
possible—policy decisions are left to the political branches. 
1. Overriding legislative intent? 
A recurring criticism of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is that courts use it to supplant, rather than 
interpret, congressional intent. Justice Stevens, for example, suggests 
that by applying the bright-line presumption against 
extraterritoriality, courts may abdicate their judicial duty “to give 
statutes the most faithful reading possible.”197 Professor Brilmayer 
takes this critique a step further, arguing the Supreme Court has not 
only abandoned its role as interpreter, but impermissibly assumed 
the role of lawmaker, “marginaliz[ing] Congress” at the expense of 
“judicial creativity.”198 Elaborating on this view, Professor Clopton 
contends that judges engage in activism whenever they restrict the 
extraterritorial application of a law that Congress meant to apply 
abroad.199 From this perspective, because the presumption obtains 
only when a statute’s extraterritorial application is unclear, there is 
always a chance that a court applying the presumption is engaging 
in  activism.200 
Admittedly, application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality suffers from the same drawback that plagues 
conventional applications of the nondelegation doctrine—although 
the presumption attempts to say “this matter is for Congress to 
resolve,” it may instead establish a default rule of territoriality, a 
result that Congress may or may not have intended for any given 
statute.201 As critics of the presumption have pointed out, 
territoriality, too, is a policy choice. 
These arguments, though superficially appealing, ignore the 
 
 197. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 280 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 198. Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American 
Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 656 (2011). 
 199. Clopton, supra note 53, at 16. 
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realities of the adjudicative process. Unfortunately, the judiciary does 
not have the luxury of tabling an issue for future consideration or 
referring the question to another body.202 In extraterritoriality cases, 
this leaves lower courts with a Hobson’s choice between actively 
making policy decisions about whether to extend U.S. law abroad or 
enforcing the territorial status quo until Congress decides otherwise.  
When the presumption against extraterritoriality is understood as 
nondelegation it becomes clear that courts applying the presumption 
are not merely entrenching a preferred territorial default, but 
protecting structural values.203 That these structural decisions have 
practical impacts is inescapable, but it does not mean that courts 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality are engaging in 
activism. Even if invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality 
involves decisions with practical effects, “[a] certain degree 
of  discretion, and thus of lawmaking inheres in most . . . 
judicial  action.”204  
By applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the 
Supreme Court thus provides lower courts with the means to avoid 
the nondelegation issues that would arise if judges were required to 
decide whether Congress would have wanted a statute to apply 
abroad. While the presumption directs courts to make a clear, 
circumscribed inquiry, many alternatives would have judges 
navigating the treacherous straits of international diplomacy to 
determine when extraterritoriality is advisable. In other words, at 
least in the context of deciding whether U.S. law should apply 
abroad, the Court is choosing the structural option that results in 
the least judicial policymaking. 
 
 202. Although courts might instead invoke the political question or other justiciability 
doctrines to avoid considering politically-charged extraterritoriality cases altogether, use of 
these doctrines would do little to satisfy critics of the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
since judicial examination of extraterritorial cases would only decrease. 
 203. In this sense, when the Supreme Court applies the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, it engages in what Professor Bradley calls “structural activism”—“designed 
to protect the separation of powers between the judiciary and the political branches . . . and 
. . . more comfortably within the competence and authority of the judiciary than activism in 
applying statutes extraterritorially.” Bradley, supra note 54, at 551–52 n.231. Of course, the 
term “structural activism” is somewhat of a misnomer, since the Court seems to be exercising 
judicial power to fulfill, quite appropriately, its responsibility to police the structural 
boundaries put in place by the Constitution. 
 204. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384–85 (1989). 
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Those who oppose the presumption against extraterritoriality 
also point out the potential for judicial abuse associated with 
identifying precisely when an activity is excessively extraterritorial.205 
The Supreme Court’s test for this inquiry is whether the 
extraterritorial activity in question relates to the “focus” of Congress’ 
statutory concern; if it does, and Congress is silent regarding foreign 
application, the presumption applies.206 Not only is it difficult to 
pinpoint Congress’ regulatory objective, these critics argue, the 
broad nature of the “focus” inquiry is susceptible to judicial 
cherry-picking. 
While determining the “focus” of statutory text may be 
difficult207—and the Court has admittedly not afforded lower courts 
much guidance on this issue208—the question becomes one of 
construing the existing text, rather than divining the meaning of 
congressional silence. The requirement that the domestic conduct 
pertain to the “focus” of the statute ensures that Congress has truly 
made the choice regarding the policy at issue. If the presumption 
were overcome merely because a case has minor ties to the United 
States, but the activity Congress was seeking to regulate occurred 
outside the United States, courts would still be left making the 
policy-wrought decision of extraterritoriality for statutes silent on 
that point. Though demanding and potentially open to abuse, the 
task is one for which courts are constitutionally charged and 
institutionally capable. 
2. Lack of deference to the executive branch 
The presumption has also come under fire for giving insufficient 
weight to the views of the executive branch.209 Although courts have 
often consulted the views of the executive in foreign affairs 
matters,210 the Court has sometimes applied the presumption against 
 
 205. See Clopton, supra note 53, at 7 (“[N]othing in the canonical statement of the 
presumption tells courts what qualifies as an extraterritorial case.”). 
 206. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010). 
 207. Brilmayer, supra note 181, at 393. 
 208. Gardner, supra note 6, at 135–36. 
 209. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 17. 
 210. The Supreme Court previously went so far as to call the executive branch the “one 
voice” for the nation in foreign affairs. See David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 953, 954 (2014); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
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extraterritoriality over objections by the executive branch. This was 
the case in both Morrison, which declined to follow the Solicitor 
General’s view that private securities suits could be based on foreign 
conduct,211 and Aramco, which did not accept the EEOC’s 
arguments that Title VII should apply abroad.212 
Although the presumption’s seeming disregard for the views of 
the executive is at first perplexing, this result makes sense under the 
nondelegation paradigm. The Court often considers the executive’s 
views in matters of foreign affairs,213 but the question of 
extraterritoriality is a question of constitutional structure. Such 
questions belong to the judiciary.214 This does not mean the Supreme 
Court ignores the institutional role of the executive branch as a 
leading voice in foreign affairs. Indeed, the check of prosecutorial 
discretion may mitigate some of the concerns of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.215 But while the executive’s views may be 
helpful to provide context or to explain potential policy implications, 
it is the responsibility of courts to determine whether there is 
sufficient congressional intent to displace the nondelegation 
concerns that would inhere if Congress had delegated the task of 
discerning a statute’s geographic scope to the courts. In other words, 
even if the Court adopted the executive’s position, the decision 
would still be the product of judicial policymaking—an outcome 
contrary to the nondelegation principles underlying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. 
3. Scrutiny of private rights of action 
The Supreme Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco spurred new 
separation-of-powers attacks on the Court’s presumption against 
 
320  (1936). 
 211. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270. 
 212. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
 213. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer, 
J.,  concurring). 
 214. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (calling determination of whether 
a statute impinged on the President’s constitutional recognition power a “familiar judicial 
exercise”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983) (holding that “[r]esolution of litigation 
challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches” was a decision for 
the  courts). 
 215. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (citing Sosa v. 
Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)). 
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extraterritoriality doctrine. Commentators took particular issue216 
with the Court’s decision to apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality separately to RICO’s private cause of action rather 
than ending its inquiry after finding that the substantive provisions 
of the statute applied extraterritorially.217 Just as Justice Ginsburg 
argued in dissent in RJR Nabisco, these commentators suggest that 
the Court ought to adopt a statutory interpretation “linking, not 
separating, prohibited activities and authorized remedies.”218 
Professor Anthony Colangelo, for example, argues that because 
Congress provided a clear indication that RICO’s substantive 
prohibitions applied abroad, applying the presumption to RICO’s 
private action “transform[ed] the statute that Congress enacted into 
one the Court would have preferred.”219 This, he claims, is the latest 
leg of a “myopic quest to quash the private right of action in 
transnational cases.”220 In line with Colangelo’s views, Maggie 
Gardner asserts that by applying the presumption separately to 
private remedies, the Court was moving the goalposts—imposing a 
“series of hoops” to make it so “Congress cannot win.”221 
a. Private rights and nondelegation generally. Contrary to these 
arguments, there is a principled, structural explanation for the 
Court’s use of the presumption against extraterritoriality. In RJR 
Nabisco, the Court explains why it applies the presumption against 
extraterritoriality separately to RICO’s private right of action: “‘Each 
of th[e] decisions’ involved in defining a cause of action based on 
‘conduct within the territory of another sovereign’ ‘carries with it 
significant foreign policy implications.’”222 The Court applies the 
presumption because of the distinct policy decisions involved with 
authorizing private causes of action to conduct occurring 
 
 216. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 6, at 135 (warning of “worrisome implications for 
separation of powers”). 
 217. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (“[W]e separately apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to RICO’s cause of action despite our conclusion that the presumption has 
been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions.”). 
 218. Id. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 219. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 53. 
 220. Id. at 55. 
 221. Gardner, supra note 6, at 141, 143. 
 222. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013)). 
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outside  U.S. borders. In other words, the Court is concerned 
about  nondelegation. 
When Congress creates a private cause of action but fails to 
specify whether it applies extraterritorially, it leaves outstanding “a 
decision to permit enforcement without the check of prosecutorial 
discretion.”223 Because that decision—whether to “provid[e] a 
private civil remedy for foreign conduct”—involves a “potential for 
international friction beyond that presented by merely applying U.S. 
substantive law to that foreign conduct,”224 it is a foreign policy 
choice independent of the decision to recognize a cause of action in 
the first place.  
 By applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court 
recognizes that both of these choices belong to Congress. Just as 
implying a right of action for domestic litigants “allows the Judicial 
Branch to assume policymaking authority vested by the Constitution 
in the Legislative Branch,”225 extending such a right to foreign 
plaintiffs without clear intent from Congress would impermissibly 
exercise lawmaking power.   
 Hence, where Congress fails to speak on the extraterritoriality 
issue, the Court applies the presumption to reject a delegation of 
policymaking authority and avoid enlisting courts in unilaterally 
extending the power and protections of U.S. law abroad.226 
 
   223. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004). 
 224. Id. 
  225. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 743, 747 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“T]he implication of a right of action not authorized by Congress denigrates the democratic 
process . . . . [I]t is the constitutional function of the Legislative Branch, subject as it is to the 
checks of the political process, to make this judgment.”); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
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(quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727). From a nondelegation vantage point, this result may appear 
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considered together, the executive and judicial branches have enough residual legislative power 
to allow extraterritorial suits to go forward without implicating separation-of-powers concerns. 
But the simpler answer is that, in the cases that find the presumption against extraterritoriality 
rebutted as to substantive provisions of the statute, there has been a clear indication of 
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b. Comparing statutory and judicially-implied causes of action. 
Critics have contended that the Court’s concern with the private 
cause of action is misplaced because Congress itself created the cause 
of action. In particular, these commentators criticize the RJR 
Nabisco majority’s reliance on Kiobel and Sosa. In those cases, 
decided under the ATS, the cause of action had to be implied by 
courts, whereas in RJR Nabisco, Congress had already provided the 
cause of action by statute.227 Because the political branches intended 
RICO to apply to criminal activity abroad and also enacted a private 
right of action, the argument goes, any concerns about the 
extraterritorial application of the private right “had already been 
(democratically) taken into account and overcome,” making 
the  Court’s application of the presumption “incongruous 
and  selective.”228 
Assuming that Congress has considered the extraterritoriality 
question with respect to private actions, however, begs the question. 
The argument that statutory text showing Congress intends a 
statute’s criminal provisions to apply extraterritorially is evidence that 
Congress also intends the statute’s separate private right of action to 
extend to extraterritorial conduct requires an inferential step. This is 
particularly true of RICO, which does not expressly address the 
extraterritoriality of the statute’s criminal provisions at all, but leaves 
that question to the statutes that specify predicate offenses.229 Thus, 
the Court’s application of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
to private rights of action is based on the equally permissible notion 
that Congress does not intend such actions to apply abroad.230 
Considered in light of the nondelegation concerns that drive the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, it is not difficult to see why 
the Court errs on the side of applying the presumption. 
c. Private claims and political branch intent. Not only is applying 
the presumption against extraterritoriality separately to criminal and 
private rights of action at least an equally acceptable statutory 
 
congressional intent to that effect. Thus, while the Court sometimes seems to treat executive 
prosecutorial discretion as a thumb on the scale, it has not yet proven to be a decisive factor. 
 227. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 54. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text. 
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construction, there is evidence that both political branches prefer this 
interpretation. Congress, as noted above, responded to the Morrison 
Court’s call to clarify the extraterritorial scope of the Exchange Act 
of 1934 by specifying that the criminal provisions of section 10(b) 
apply to fraudulent activity and sales occurring abroad.231 Notably, 
however, Congress declined to provide for the extraterritorial 
application of private 10(b) actions.232 The executive branch, for its 
part, has argued in several contexts that courts should interpret 
ambiguous statutes to allow federal prosecutors to penalize foreign 
wrongdoing but limit private actions to conduct with a close 
domestic connection.233 This was the case in both RJR Nabisco and 
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A.,234 as well as in various 
antitrust cases heard by circuit courts.235 These anecdotes suggest 
that not only does the Court’s application of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality not disregard the democratic process, but 
may also result in outcomes that the political branches approve.236 
Ultimately, allegations that the Court’s use of the presumption is 
motivated by anti-litigant activism fail to address why an activist 
judiciary bent on restricting private suits would adopt such a 
restrictive interpretative tool. If the Court’s goal is to decimate 
private actions,237 the presumption against extraterritoriality is a 
strange choice of armament.238 In a war on private actions, surely the 
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Court would have chosen a weapon that would allow it the 
discretion to strike down private cases with impunity. The Court’s 
restrained approach suggests that it uses the presumption to further 
structural rather than policy goals. 
To summarize, criticism of the presumption against extra-
territoriality on the grounds of judicial activism and separation of 
powers ultimately does not bear out. When understood in 
nondelegation terms, it is clear that the presumption is not carte 
blanche for activist judges with territorial sympathies, but a check on 
delegations of policymaking power to the judiciary. Viewed in this 
light, the Supreme Court’s treatment of executive-branch positions 
and private rights of action show that it is fulfilling its constitutional 
role of ensuring that the political branches make major 
policy  decisions. 
D. The Presumption’s Application to Jurisdictional Statutes 
Another question that has vexed foreign relations scholars after 
both Kiobel and RJR Nabisco involves the Supreme Court’s 
declaration that courts must apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality “regardless of whether the statute in question 
regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.”239 
This pronouncement troubles scholars because the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is a merits determination—they worry that 
lower courts would (and have) incorrectly applied the presumption 
as a limit on subject matter jurisdiction,240 contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s clarification on the subject in Morrison.241 As Professor 
William Dodge argues, the presumption, correctly understood, 
should apply only to implied causes of action underlying purely 
jurisdictional statutes, such as the federal common law causes of 
action under the Alien Tort Statute to which the Court applied the 
presumption in Kiobel.242 
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Dodge’s analysis rings true, but there is a broader point here. 
The Court applies the presumption against extraterritoriality to the 
causes of action underlying jurisdictional statutes because the 
presumption is a nondelegation canon. Specifically, application of 
nondelegation principles, of which the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is an example, seems to turn on whether there are 
separation concerns as a de facto matter. The Supreme Court’s 
discussion of the separation-of-powers principles that underlie the 
nondelegation doctrine in Mistretta is instructive on this score. 
In Mistretta, the Court considered a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a unique body 
located within the judicial branch but not endowed with judicial 
power.243 In analyzing whether the placement of the Commission 
violated separation of powers principles, the Court turned to Justice 
John Marshall’s nondelegation discussion in Wayman for the 
proposition that the judicial branch may assume certain 
administrative and rulemaking duties to the extent “necessary and 
proper . . . for carrying into execution all the judgments which the 
judicial department has power to pronounce.”244 
When the petitioners in Mistretta argued that the Commission’s 
power was impermissible because it was substantive, rather than 
merely procedural, the Court stated: “Our separation-of-powers 
analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity as ‘substantive’ as 
opposed to ‘procedural,’ or ‘political’ as opposed to ‘judicial.’”245 
Instead, the Court focused on the practical consequences of the 
congressional delegation—namely, whether it threatened to 
“expand[] the powers of the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds 
by uniting within the Branch the political or quasi-legislative power 
of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts.”246 In other 
words, the relevant question was not the nature of the grant of 
power, but the separation-of-powers consequences it would produce. 
The same applies in cases with questions of extraterritoriality—the 
relevant question is not the nature of the statute, but whether it calls 
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upon courts to make policy choices in the sensitive area of foreign 
affairs. Because those policy choices arise whenever there is an 
extraterritoriality gap, and such gaps arise in connection with both 
substantive statutes and the implied rights of action underlying 
jurisdictional statutes, the Court applies the presumption 
in  both  instances. Thus, the nondelegation understanding 
of  the  presumption against extraterritoriality sheds light on 
why  the  Court  speaks of applying the presumption to 
jurisdictional  statutes. 
E. Nondelegation Deficiencies of Alternatives to the Presumption 
Another major theme of the criticisms leveled against the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is that its blunt, categorical 
approach is not nimble enough to address the complexities involved 
in international cases.247 These scholars argue that even if the Court’s 
justifications for the presumption are valid, the Court does not 
adequately explain why it does not use a more flexible alternative.248 
To fill this void, critics of the presumption have suggested a variety 
of tests to determine when U.S. law should apply abroad. This 
Section argues that understanding the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as nondelegation explains why the Supreme Court 
has preferred the presumption over three other approaches 
to  the  extraterritoriality question: applying the Charming 
Betsy  canon,  using limiting principles, and divining congressional 
intent.  Because  each of these proposed alternatives calls upon 
courts to  make  foreign  policy determinations, principles of 
nondelegation  counsel in favor  of  applying the presumption 
against  extraterritoriality. 
1. The Charming Betsy canon 
Some commentators have suggested that the Court should 
discard the presumption against extraterritoriality in favor of the 
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Charming Betsy canon.249 The Charming Betsy canon originates in 
the 1804 case of the same name and instructs courts that “act[s] of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if 
any other possible construction remains.”250 In other words, where a 
statute is ambiguous, a court applying the Charming Betsy canon will 
adopt an interpretation that conforms with international law, under 
the assumption that Congress does not intend to violate 
international law unless it expressly says so. Proponents of 
substituting the Charming Betsy canon for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality would tie the question of extraterritoriality to 
international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction.251 These 
principles specify when nations can permissibly exercise jurisdiction 
and, according to the most recent Restatement, allow states to 
adjudicate claims based not only on territoriality but also on 
nationality and conduct that causes effects in or is directed at the 
state in question.252 
Deciding questions of extraterritoriality using only the Charming 
Betsy canon would require courts to assume Congress intends 
statutes to apply abroad to the maximum extent that international 
law will allow.253 This is a departure from the traditional conception 
of the Charming Betsy canon, which has traditionally been used as a 
“braking mechanism”—courts typically apply the canon “to restrain 
the scope of federal enactments . . . not . . . to give such enactments 
a more expansive reading.”254 
There are important nondelegation reasons for believing that the 
Court should not use the Charming Betsy canon in such an 
aggressive fashion. Applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is still necessary because even when Congress can 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law, the 
question of whether U.S. law should apply extraterritorially still 
involves a foreign policy choice. In Morrison, for example, even 
though the “effects” test would have been a valid and 
 
 249. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 23–25. 
 250. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 251. Clopton, supra note 53, at 23–25. 
 252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 253. Clopton, supra note 53, at 24–25. 
 254. Bradley, supra note 183, at 490. 
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uncontroversial exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction under the well-
accepted subjective territorial principle,255 foreign amici still objected 
to the application of U.S. law.256 The point here is not to show that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is a superior tool for 
averting foreign conflict, but to suggest that the extraterritoriality 
decision still involves policy choices when principles of 
prescriptive  jurisdiction would allow U.S. law to apply 
abroad.  In  short,  the  Charming Betsy canon does not resolve 
nondelegation  issues. 
Additionally, those who argue for replacing the presumption 
with the Charming Betsy canon overlook that their critique of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as a tool of judicial activism to 
override congressional intent is a criticism of interpretative canons 
generally.257 By advocating for a different canon, these critics merely 
argue that the Court should adopt the canon that reflects their 
policy preference—that US law should apply abroad to the 
maximum extent that international law allows. By contrast, the 
Supreme Court’s use of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
draws its legitimacy not from ideas about the ideal conduct of 
foreign relations policy, but from the structural principles that 
underlie the nondelegation doctrine. To apply only the Charming 
Betsy canon would be to give courts full discretion to decide 
a  statute’s geographic scope. This, the Court’s recent 
extraterritoriality  cases show, is simply unacceptable from a 
nondelegation perspective. 
As a result, courts should apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality first, since it does the best job of ensuring that 
Congress—not courts—decides the question of extraterritoriality. In 
cases where the presumption does not apply or is overcome, the 
Charming Betsy canon acts as a backstop to avert extreme foreign 
relations results. This approach is in line with that endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in cases where the presumption against 
extraterritoriality does not apply.258 In any event, the presumption 
 
 255. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 256. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010). 
 257. See Bradley, supra note 183, at 505–07. 
 258. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); see also Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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against extraterritoriality’s superior protection of nondelegation 
values may explain the Supreme Court’s continued adherence to the 
presumption in foreign relations cases. 
2. Discretionary limiting principles 
The nondelegation principles preserved by the presumption 
against extraterritoriality also explain why the Supreme Court clings 
to the presumption instead of embracing more flexible alternatives. 
In his concurring opinion in Kiobel, Justice Breyer proposed a 
“jurisdictional” alternative to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality that focuses on whether the person violating the 
statute is an American national and whether the violation occurred in 
the United States or violated an important American national 
interest.259 This initial inquiry would “rel[y] upon courts also 
invoking” “[f]urther limiting principles” such as exhaustion of 
remedies, forum non conveniens, and international comity.260 
It  would  also “depend[] (for its workability) upon courts 
obtaining,  and  paying particular attention to, the views of the 
Executive  Branch.”261 
This discretionary approach fails for reasons grounded in the 
nondelegation doctrine.262 The approach is largely indeterminate, 
offering lower courts no analytical structure and little guidance. 
Courts are left to determine on a case-by-case basis whether they 
should recognize foreign comity interests, defer to the executive, 
require that plaintiffs exhaust remedies in other tribunals, or simply 
 
 259. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Note that Justice Breyer is apparently not categorically opposed 
to the presumption against extraterritoriality. He concurred with the Court’s application of the 
presumption in Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. In RJR Nabisco, he concurred with the Court’s use 
of the presumption with respect to RICO’s substantive provisions, but he also argued that the 
presumption should not apply separately to the statute’s private right of action. RJR Nabisco, 
Inc. v. European Cmty.,136 S. Ct. 2090, 2116 (2016). 
 260. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674, 1677. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Justice Breyer had earlier applied a version of this open-ended inquiry in Empagran, 
an antitrust case in which foreign victims of an international price-fixing conspiracy 
perpetuated by a foreign vitamin cartel attempted to seek redress under the U.S. antitrust laws. 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). Writing for the Court, 
Justice Breyer held that notions of international comity required the Court to find that claims 
brought by foreign victims for foreign antitrust violations committed by foreign cartelists were 
not actionable under the U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 165. 
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decide that the case is better suited for an alternative forum. In 
effect, this method gives courts free reign both to decide what is 
“reasonable” in any given case and to enforce that result with the 
judicial doctrine of their choosing. That Justice Breyer’s test 
recommends that courts obtain and give weight to the views of the 
executive branch provides little comfort. In RJR Nabisco, for 
example, Justice Breyer suggested that the majority had deferred too 
much to the executive branch’s claims that private RICO suits were 
detrimental to international relations.263 This suggests that the 
decision of extraterritoriality would be almost completely within 
the  discretion of the judiciary—a result that runs afoul 
of  nondelegation. 
Also troubling is Justice Breyer’s suggestion that courts 
determine what types of extraterritorial conduct implicate 
“important American national interest[s].”264 This proposal would 
require courts to determine when national interests are at stake and 
define those interests in the first place. But identifying the nation’s 
priorities is the province of the democratically-accountable political 
branches; when the task requires interpreting the will and interests of 
the body politic, it is paramount that the people’s chosen 
representatives make the decision. Hence, this discretionary 
approach invites judges to engage in foreign policy-making—a 
responsibility the Constitution delegates to Congress, not 
the  judiciary. 
3. Divining congressional intent 
Another approach to determining extraterritoriality when the 
statute in question is silent or ambiguous is to determine what 
Congress would have wanted had it considered the issue. This 
approach, which the Court expressly repudiated in Morrison, was 
espoused by the Second Circuit, other courts of appeal, and Justice 
Stevens.265 Predictably, the nondelegation doctrine sheds light on 
why the Court opted to apply the presumption against 
 
 263. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2116 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Note that Justice Breyer 
did not expressly apply the framework he introduced in Kiobel, in RJR Nabisco, or, for that 
matter, in Morrison. 
 264. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671. 
 265. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257–61 (2010). 
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extraterritoriality instead of attempting to determine what Congress 
would have done had it considered whether the statute should apply 
to foreign activity. 
 
The majority opinion in Morrison expresses a marked distaste for 
the “unpredictable and inconsistent” conduct and effects tests used 
by lower courts to determine extraterritoriality in section 10(b) 
claims.266 The Court rejected the notion that congressional silence 
invited the judiciary to “divin[e] what Congress would have wanted” 
if it had considered the matter and that courts should consider new 
factors in any given case.267  
Morrison’s rejection of the post-hoc-intent approach comports 
with nondelegation principles. As Justice Scalia observed, deciding 
what Congress would have wanted ultimately boils down to a policy 
choice.268 By rejecting tests that may invite expansive judicial 
policymaking in favor of the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
Morrison upholds structural nondelegation norms. The 
presumption’s ability to preserve structural norms helps 
explain  why  the Court continues to apply it instead of 
attempting  to  construct  congressional intent as to the scope of 
geoambiguous  statutes. 
4. A note on institutional competence 
The preceding paragraphs illustrate that alternatives to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality—applying the Charming Betsy 
canon, using limiting principles, and divining congressional intent—
all take for granted that the Court should use some sort of 
interpretative device to determine if extraterritoriality is appropriate 
for a statute. Each of the approaches fails to consider, however, that 
Congress, not courts, should make the sensitive policy decision of 
extraterritoriality. Although insistence on congressional policymaking 
may seem unduly doctrinaire, there are important functional 
justifications for enforcing nondelegation with respect to the 
 
 266. Id. at 256, 258, 260 (criticizing the various formulations of the conduct and effects 
tests as “complex in formulation,” “unpredictable in application,” and estranged from any 
“textual or even extra textual” foundation). 
 267. Id. at 256. 
 268. Id. at 259. 
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judiciary. Courts are “fundamentally underequipped to formulate 
national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in 
nature”269—the type of choices inherent in questions of statutory 
extraterritoriality. This idea—that the Constitution does not endow 
courts with the tools necessary for policymaking—is an important 
motivation of both the nondelegation doctrine and the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.270 
Without the resources to engage in a comprehensive review of an 
issue, judges must make decisions based on relatively limited 
knowledge. This handicap, a result of the Constitution’s institutional 
design, means federal courts are unable to evaluate issues 
holistically.271 Judges may decide only the cases and controversies 
before them, so issues can be resolved only—and quite literally—on 
a case-by-case basis.272 The judiciary also lacks the flexibility the 
political branches enjoy. Because of stare decisis and the weight of 
precedent, courts cannot easily reverse course if a decision produces 
inadvertent negative foreign policy consequences. Courts, in 
other  words, are not functionally prepared to make foreign 
policy  decisions. 
Because of these deficiencies, enforcing nondelegation as to the 
judiciary does not pose the same drawbacks as limiting delegations to 
executive agencies—there is no trade-off between formalism and 
functionalism. While agencies have the expertise to excel in the 
specialized fields they regulate, unelected judges are generally ill-
suited to assume policy-making roles. Courts have no information-
gathering capacity to speak of; their review is largely limited to 
litigation briefs.  
 
 269. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (quoting 
United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 270. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) 
(applying the presumption against extraterritoriality because “[congress] alone has the facilities 
necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision”); James O. Freedman, Delegation 
of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 CHI. L. REV. 307, 317–22 (1976). 
   271. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 140 
(2d ed. 1996) (“Judge-made law . . . can serve foreign policy only interstitially, grossly, and 
spasmodically; [courts’] attempts to draw lines and make exceptions must be bound in 
doctrine and justified in reasoned opinions, and they cannot provide flexibility, completeness, 
and comprehensive coherence.”). 
 272. Nielson, supra note 78, at 268 (“Generalist judges are ‘not experts’ and they 
‘encounter issues one case at a time, which may make it hard for them to see the big picture.’” 
(quoting Lemos, supra note 78, at 445–46)). 
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These informational limitations are particularly acute in the 
context of foreign affairs. Unlike the executive branch and Congress, 
the Supreme Court cannot maintain a running diplomatic dialogue 
with foreign nations. The Court’s use of amicus briefs in RJR 
Nabisco provides a poignant example of the judiciary’s institutional 
incapacity to conduct foreign affairs. In RJR Nabisco, the Court 
attempted to grapple with this drawback by looking to amicus briefs 
filed in previous extraterritoriality cases by the same European 
countries who were the respondents in RJR Nabisco.273 The Court 
noted that while the respondent countries wanted to avail themselves 
of RICO’s private treble damages action, these countries had 
previously warned that private treble damages suits based on foreign 
conduct in antitrust cases would have “unjustifiably permit[ed] their 
citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby 
upsetting a balance of competing considerations that their own 
domestic . . . laws embody.”274 Citing this discrepancy, the Court 
declined to apply a “double standard” to foreign countries and other 
private plaintiffs.275 
The RJR Nabisco Court’s use of amicus briefs from previous 
cases is rather unusual.276 Professor Bookman argues this 
“unprecedented” use of prior amicus briefs is an unfortunate 
instance of “gotcha” diplomacy that undermines the Court’s claims 
of preserving international harmony.277 These arguments are well-
taken, but they only reinforce the necessity of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Without the diplomatic intelligence 
available to other branches, courts are left grasping for whatever 
 
 273. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106–07 (2016). 
 274. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Alito also cited to amicus briefs submitted in 
Morrison, where France—a respondent in RJR Nabisco—warned that allowing private U.S. 
securities claims based on extraterritorial activity would interfere with foreign securities 
regulatory regimes, “upset[ing a] delicate balance and offend[ing] the sovereign interests of 
foreign nations.” Id. at 2107 (citations omitted). 
 275. Id. at 2108. 
 276. Bookman, supra note 181, at 60; see also Kristen Eichensehr, Legal scholarship 
highlight: Foreign-government amici and foreign relations, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 21, 2016, 
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information they can marshal to make difficult decisions about 
sensitive foreign affairs issues. By applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the Court can avoid278 the jurisprudential 
equivalent of bringing a knife to a gunfight—inserting itself into the 
explosive realm of foreign affairs armed only with law clerks and 
litigation briefs.  
In short, the nondelegation view of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality helps explain why the Supreme Court prefers the 
categorical presumption to other, more discretionary alternatives. As 
the foregoing evaluation of three of these alternatives—the 
Charming Betsy canon, limiting principles, and constructed 
congressional intent—suggests, discretionary approaches fail to 
adequately protect against the potential for judicial policymaking. 
The presumption against extraterritoriality, on the other hand, 
accounts for nondelegation concerns and the institutional 
competence considerations that inform them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent applications of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality signal a more robust insistence on clear 
congressional indications that statutes apply outside the territorial 
borders of the United States. This Comment has argued that this 
insistence is driven not by judicial preference, but principles of 
nondelegation. By applying the presumption, the Supreme Court 
rebuffs a broad congressional delegation of policymaking 
responsibility to the judiciary—the decision of whether U.S. law 
should apply abroad. Understanding the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as nondelegation makes clear that the Supreme 
Court is motivated not by a penchant for territorialism, but the need 
to preserve structural values. In addition to shedding light on 
previously unanswered questions regarding the presumption’s 
rationales and application, the nondelegation paradigm explains why 
the Court prefers the presumption to other approaches to managing 
foreign conflict. Ultimately, the presumption ensures that sensitive 
 
 278. Note that the RJR Nabisco Court’s discussion of foreign amicus briefs was dicta 
used to support its application of the presumption against extraterritoriality. See RJR Nabisco, 
136 S. Ct. at 2106–08. Still, it illustrates the type of information upon which the Court might 
be forced to rely in the absence of the presumption. 
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questions of foreign policy are made by the branches most 
competent to do so—those elected through the democratic process. 
In this sense, the presumption against extraterritoriality is less about 
territorial boundaries and more about constitutional ones. 
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